Complainant’s Evidence of Injury and Causation

The Complainant’s Evidence of Injury and Causation

Based on the affidavits given by the complainant and his wife, we find

that the agency’s discrimination caused marital strain, sleeplessness,

professional humiliation and embarrassment, and stress.  The Commission

also concludes, however, that the complainant has not established

a connection between the agency’s discrimination and his headaches,

stomach aches, and nausea.  Specifically, although the complainant

sought medical treatment for these conditions, no physician who treated

him attributed them to the agency’s actions.  The Commission will now

address the complainant’s entitlement to the damages he has requested.

As discussed, the complainant argues that his situation is similar

to those experienced by the complainants in Carpenter and Wallis.

In those cases, however, both individuals were diagnosed with mental

and/or physical impairments found to be related to the agency’s

actions.<0>  Conversely, the complainant has adduced no medical evidence

that establishes that his various physical and/or mental problems were

related to the agency’s discrimination.  Therefore, the Commission finds

that this situation is clearly distinguishable from the ones in Wallis

and Carpenter.  At the same time, the Commission notes that medical

evidence is not mandatory to establishing an entitlement to damages,

and the Commission has done so in a number of cases. See Damiano

v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05980311 (February 28, 1999)

($5,000 in damages based on statements from complainant and co-workers

that the agency’s action left him hurt, angry, and depressed); Miller

v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01956109 (January 23, 1998)

($7,500 in damages based on complainant’s testimony that he experienced

severe stress and anxiety); Benson v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC Appeal No. 01952854 (June 27, 1996) ($5,000 in damages based on

testimony from complainant, family members, and co-workers regarding

the embarrassment and humiliation he experienced).

Like the complainants in Damiano, Miller, and Benson, the complainant’s

claim for damages is based exclusively on lay evidence attesting to

various problems, including embarrassment, humiliation, stress, marital

strain, and loss of self-esteem.  Therefore, we find that the award in

this case should be in the range of the awards in those cases rather than

the awards in Wallis and Carpenter.  Furthermore, we note that, although

the discrimination in this case lasted several years, more than half of

the discriminatory events pre-date the passage of the Civil Rights Act

of 1991, and, therefore, are not compensable.  Based on the foregoing,

the Commission finds that the agency’s award of $9,000 is appropriate

to compensate the complainant for his losses.

Randall F. Sobol v. United States Postal Service

01986262

June 21, 2000

Randall F. Sobol,              )

Complainant,                  )

)  Appeal No. 01986262

v.                )  Agency No. 1-F-968-1001-93

)

William J. Henderson,          )

Postmaster General,            )

United States Postal Service,  )

Agency.                       )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

The complainant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the agency

concerning his claim that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.<0>  The appeal

is accepted by the Commission in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether the agency correctly calculated

the compensatory damages to which the complainant is entitled.

BACKGROUND

During the period in question, the complainant was employed as

Senior Operations Specialist, EAS-21, at the agency’s Processing and

Distribution Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.  The complainant filed three EEO

complaints between 1991 and 1993 alleging that he had been discriminated

against based on race (Caucasian/white), national origin (Northern

European/Anglo), and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when: (1) on April

16, 1990, he was denied a requested endorsement for an exemption to the

requirements of the Postal Career Executive Service Candidacy program;

(2) on May 16, 1990, he was not selected for the position of Regional

Automation Advisor, EAS-23; (3) on November 29, 1990, he was not selected

for the position of Manager, Logistics and Distribution Systems, EAS-21;

(4) he received a negative evaluation in support of his application

for the position of Manager, Logistics and Distribution Systems; (5)

on January 22, 1993, he was not placed in the position of Manager,

In-Plant Support, EAS-23, or Manager, Distribution Operations, EAS-22;

(6) on April 20, 1993, he was not selected to fill a one-year vacancy for

the position of Manager, Operations, EAS-23; and (7) on June 10, 1993,

and continuing for approximately one month, he was moved from his office

and had no desk, telephone or computer.  Following an investigation of

these complaints, the complainant requested an administrative hearing,

but subsequently withdrew that request.  The agency thereafter issued

a final decision on December 20, 1994, finding no discrimination with

regard to all seven issues.

The complainant appealed the agency’s decision and the Commission found

the complainant had established that the agency had engaged in a pattern

of discrimination against him.<0> Sobol v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC

01952039 (May 27, 1997).  As relief, the decision ordered the agency

to retroactively place the complainant into the position of Manager,

In-Plant Support, EAS-23, with back pay and other benefits, and conduct

a supplemental investigation on the question of compensatory damages.

Although the agency filed a request to reconsider this decision, it was

denied. Sobol v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05970909 (March

26, 1998).  The complainant thereafter submitted evidence in support of

compensatory damages and the agency issued a decision (FAD) dated July 27,

1998, awarding $9,000 in non-pecuniary damages and no pecuniary damages.

It is from that decision that the complainant now appeals.

Evidence of Injury

The primary piece of evidence submitted by the complainant in support of

his claim is an affidavit dated May 21, 1998.  In describing the effects

of the agency’s actions, he testified, in relevant part:

[T]he eight long years in which the Agency discriminated … against

me … caused me damage to my family relationships, degrading and

humiliating loss of self-esteem and self confidence in my abilities, loss

of professional standing among my peers and subordinates, career stalling,

emotional and physical distress, embarrassment, humiliation, defamation

resulting in nausea, severe headaches, difficulty in concentrating,

emotional stress at work, irritability at home, marital strain, loss

of sleep, and the exile and isolation treatment I had to endure from

the Agency.

According to the complainant, his physical problems began in 1989 when

he began working for the individual who became the District Manager

(DM).  According to the complainant, the DM’s treatment of him resulted

in stomach aches, nausea, and severe headaches and required him to seek

medical attention.  Although the complainant submitted medical records

indicating that he sought treatment for these conditions, they do not

indicate whether there was a relationship between these conditions and

the agency’s actions.  In this regard, a review of the documentation

reveals that the individuals who examined the complainant were never

able to determine the etiology of his conditions.

With regard to the strain on his family, the complainant testified that

the agency’s actions not only caused stress with his wife but prevented

him from enjoying fully his relationship with his young daughter.

According to the complainant, this was attributable not only to his

preoccupation with the agency’s actions, but also to the fact that both

his wife and several of the individuals named in the complaint are of

Japanese descent.  Regarding his professional standing, the complainant

states that he was particularly devastated by his non-selection for the

Manager, In-Plant Support, position in 1993, noting that it resulted

in him being placed into the position of Senior Operations Analyst.

The complainant states that he had little knowledge of that position,

and that, when he was initially placed in it, he was moved out of his

existing office and forced to work out of a utility cart without a desk,

computer, or telephone.  The complainant described this situation as

“professionally humiliating,” stating that it resulted in the loss of

esteem in the eyes of his co-workers.  Finally, the complainant states

that the agency’s actions have caused irreparable harm to his career,

arguing that, but for the agency’s discrimination, he would now be in

a Postal Career Executive Service (PCES) position.

The complainant also submitted an affidavit from his wife, who

corroborated his testimony that the agency’s actions placed a strain on

their relationship.  She also testified that the complainant experienced

severe headaches, grumpiness, and sleeplessness, noting in particular that

these symptoms were at their worst when he was moved out of his office.

Finally, she stated that “[i]t was common during these periods of extreme

stress for my husband to unintentionally ignore either myself or our

daughter when we were speaking to him because he was so preoccupied with

the acts of discrimination and how they were affecting his career.”

Requested Damages

In his appeal statement, the complainant contends that he is entitled

to at least $200,000 in non-pecuniary damages.  In support of this

contention, the complainant argues that the agency’s award of $9,000 is

insufficient and that the cases it cites are not on point.  Instead,

the complainant argues that the facts in Carpenter v. Department

of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995) and Wallis

v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (November 13, 1995)

are more relevant to his situation.  The complainant argues further that

he is entitled to an award of $1,000,000 in future pecuniary damages to

compensate him for the salary he would have received had he been placed

into a PCES position.  Finally, he argues that he is entitled to past

pecuniary losses to compensate him for the fact that the agency did not

properly calculate his award of back pay and associated benefits.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to § 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a complainant who

establishes his or her claim of unlawful discrimination may receive, in

addition to equitable remedies, compensatory damages for past and future

pecuniary losses (i.e., out of pocket expenses) and non-pecuniary losses

(e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).

For an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the agency,

the limit of liability for future pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages

is $300,000. Id.  In West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999), the Supreme

Court held that Congress afforded the Commission authority to award such

damages in the administrative process.

The particulars of what relief may be awarded, and what proof is

necessary to obtain that relief, are set forth in detail in EEOC

Notice No. N-915.002, Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (July 14, 1992). Briefly

stated, the complainant must submit evidence to show that the agency’s

discriminatory conduct directly or proximately caused the losses for

which damages are sought. Id. at 11-12, 14; Rivera v. Dept. of the

Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994). The amount awarded

should reflect the extent to which the agency’s discriminatory action

directly or proximately caused harm to the complainant and the extent to

which other factors may have played a part. EEOC Notice No. N-915.002

at 11-12. The amount of non-pecuniary damages should also reflect the

nature and severity of the harm to the complainant, and the duration or

expected duration of the harm. Id. at 14.

The Complainant’s Evidence of Injury and Causation

Based on the affidavits given by the complainant and his wife, we find

that the agency’s discrimination caused marital strain, sleeplessness,

professional humiliation and embarrassment, and stress.  The Commission

also concludes, however, that the complainant has not established

a connection between the agency’s discrimination and his headaches,

stomach aches, and nausea.  Specifically, although the complainant

sought medical treatment for these conditions, no physician who treated

him attributed them to the agency’s actions.  The Commission will now

address the complainant’s entitlement to the damages he has requested.

Pecuniary Damages

Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses that are incurred as a result

of the employer’s unlawful action, including job-hunting expenses,

moving expenses, medical expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical

therapy expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Id.

As discussed, the complainant requests past pecuniary damages for back

pay and lost benefits, and future pecuniary damages to compensate him

for the fact that the agency’s actions “stalled” his career.  Regarding

the former request, the Commission notes that back pay and associated

benefits  are not encompassed by an award of compensatory damages,

but, rather, constitute equitable relief under § 706(g) of Title VII.

See Mullins v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01954362 (May 22,

1997).<0>  Therefore, we find that the complainant is not entitled to

damages for these amounts.

The complainant’s argument that he is entitled to $1,000,000 in future

pecuniary damages is similarly misplaced.  Specifically, this assertion

relates to the complainant’s argument that the agency’s discrimination

kept him out of a PCES position and deprived him of future earnings

at a higher salary.  The Commission finds that the loss of future

earnings is not encompassed in an award of compensatory damages, and,

to the extent it is tantamount to a claim for front pay, falls under

the equitable relief provision of § 706(g). See Wilson v. Department

of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01955269 (July 29, 1997), affirmed,

Wilson v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05970991 (March

18, 1999).   Furthermore, the Commission has previously held that an

allegation that an individual would have received a promotion subsequent

to a discriminatory act is speculative, particularly when the promotion

is competitive, and has declined to presume that the individual would

have received the promotion. See Ramirez v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC

Petition No. 04950024 (February 8, 1996).  Accordingly, the Commission

finds that the complainant has not established an entitlement to future

pecuniary damages.

Non-Pecuniary Damages

In Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5,

1993), the Commission explained that “objective evidence” of non-pecuniary

damages could include a statement by the complainant explaining how

he or she was affected by the discrimination.  Statements from others,

including family members, friends, and health care providers could address

the outward manifestations of the impact of the discrimination on the

complainant. Id.  The complainant could also submit documentation

of medical or psychiatric treatment related to the effects of the

discrimination. Id.  Non-pecuniary damages must be limited to the sums

necessary to compensate the injured party for the actual harm and should

take into account the severity of the harm and the length of time the

injured party has suffered from the harm. Carpenter v. Department of

Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652.  The Commission notes that for a

proper award of non-pecuniary damages, the amount of the award should not

be “monstrously excessive” standing alone, should not be the product of

passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded

in similar cases.  See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th

Cir. 1989); US EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F.Supp. 573,

574 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

As discussed, the complainant argues that his situation is similar

to those experienced by the complainants in Carpenter and Wallis.

In those cases, however, both individuals were diagnosed with mental

and/or physical impairments found to be related to the agency’s

actions.<0>  Conversely, the complainant has adduced no medical evidence

that establishes that his various physical and/or mental problems were

related to the agency’s discrimination.  Therefore, the Commission finds

that this situation is clearly distinguishable from the ones in Wallis

and Carpenter.  At the same time, the Commission notes that medical

evidence is not mandatory to establishing an entitlement to damages,

and the Commission has done so in a number of cases. See Damiano

v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05980311 (February 28, 1999)

($5,000 in damages based on statements from complainant and co-workers

that the agency’s action left him hurt, angry, and depressed); Miller

v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01956109 (January 23, 1998)

($7,500 in damages based on complainant’s testimony that he experienced

severe stress and anxiety); Benson v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC Appeal No. 01952854 (June 27, 1996) ($5,000 in damages based on

testimony from complainant, family members, and co-workers regarding

the embarrassment and humiliation he experienced).

Like the complainants in Damiano, Miller, and Benson, the complainant’s

claim for damages is based exclusively on lay evidence attesting to

various problems, including embarrassment, humiliation, stress, marital

strain, and loss of self-esteem.  Therefore, we find that the award in

this case should be in the range of the awards in those cases rather than

the awards in Wallis and Carpenter.  Furthermore, we note that, although

the discrimination in this case lasted several years, more than half of

the discriminatory events pre-date the passage of the Civil Rights Act

of 1991, and, therefore, are not compensable.  Based on the foregoing,

the Commission finds that the agency’s award of $9,000 is appropriate

to compensate the complainant for his losses.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and after a careful review of the record,

it is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency’s award of

$9,000 in compensatory damages.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action to the extent

it has not already done so:

Within sixty (60) days of the date on which this decision becomes final,

the agency shall tender to the complainant non-pecuniary compensatory

damages in the amount of $9,000.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s

Decision.”  The report shall include evidence that the corrective action

has been implemented.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C.  20036.  The agency’s report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant.  If the agency does not comply with the Commission’s order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).  The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.  See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. §

1614.503(g).  Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled “Right to File A Civil Action.”  29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407

and 1614.408.  A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993).  If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS – ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY’S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.  In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604).  The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request.  Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration.  The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS’ RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint.  However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision.  In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission.  If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.  Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.  See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the

Court.  Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in

which to file a civil action.  Both the request and the civil action must

be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right

to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

06-21-00

Date                   Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed.  I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant’s representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________            __________________________

Date                  Equal Opportunity Assistant

01    On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC’s

federal sector complaint process went into effect.  These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the

administrative process.  Consequently, the Commission will apply the

revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable,

in deciding the present appeal.  The regulations, as amended, may also

be found at the Commission’s website at www.eeoc.gov.

02    Although the decision did not delineate which actions the

complainant had established were discriminatory, it indicated that the

finding of discrimination pertained to all the issues raised by the

complainant except for Issue 2.

03    Although the complainant acknowledges that our decision in

Appeal No. 01952039 ordered the agency to  award these damages, he argues

that the agency did not comply fully with that order.  In the event the

complainant believes that the agency is not in full compliance with

our prior decision, we note he has the right to file a petition for

enforcement with this office.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).

03    In Carpenter, the complainant was diagnosed with, among other

things, hypomania and respiratory problems, while the complainant in

Wallis was found to have experienced a relapse of his depressive disorder.