settlement agreement can stop further legal action
in the settlement minutes, he did not agree to withdraw all administrative complaints, claims,
and investigations so paragraph (3)(a) is void; (4) in the settlement
minutes, he did not agree to refrain from initiating any other actions
against the agency based on any adverse actions that allegedly occurred
before the effective date of the settlement agreement so paragraph (3)(b)
is void; and (5) in the settlement minutes, he did not agree to release
the agency from all claims or demands arising out of adverse actions
that allegedly occurred prior to the effective date of the settlement
agreement so paragraph (3)(c) is void. In addition, complainant alleged
that the agency failed to pay his travel expenses in the amount of
$750.00, which he stated is required by Federal Regulation for hearing
sites outside of the local commuting area in which the complaint arose.
Complainant indicated that he resides in Clarksville, Tennessee and the
hearing was held in Memphis, Tennessee.4 Complainant approximated a
six hour distance between the two. Complainant requested reinstatement
of the underlying complaint at the point in which processed ceased –
the hearing stage — and the reimbursement of travel expenses.
In a final decision dated June 2, 2006, the agency denied complainant’s
request to void their agreement. Specifically, the agency stated that
the parties are bound by the agreement read into the record on January
26, 2006 and the unsigned written agreement is void, complainant did
not allege that any party threatened him or conveyed an intention to
cause him harm or loss contingent upon him entering into a settlement
agreement nor that the circumstances warranted the involuntary agreement
to a settlement. The agency noted that complainant had the benefit
of legal counsel to help prevent coercion or duress. In addition, the
agency found that the January 26 verbal agreement does not provide for
mileage and lodging for complainant so he is not so entitled.
Complainant filed the instant appeal. On appeal, complainant stated
that there was a delay in his attorney (LR) contacting him regarding the
agency’s written agreement and, when LR did contact him, he expressed
concerns to her about the written agreement5 and, on the hearing day, LR
provided information to him about her prior experiences with the assigned
AJ that pressured him to settle. In addition, complainant reiterated his
previous contention that the agency added terms in the written agreement
that were not part of the oral agreement before the AJ and again requested
reinstatement of his underlying complaint at the hearing stage.
In opposition to complainant’s appeal, the agency stated that the agency
submitted the written settlement agreement to complainant’s attorney of
record, LR, twice but there is no technical requirement that the parties
sign the written settlement agreement when the terms of an agreement are
settled before an AJ and recorded on a hearing transcript; the agreement
is valid and enforceable; the agency has complied with the terms of the
agreement and any non-compliance is due to the actions of complainant6;
complainant failed to show that he agreed to the terms of the agreement
based on coercion or duress; and complainant was represented by an
attorney who would prevent any coercion or duress during the settlement
process.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of
contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract’s construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng’g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, the record reveals that, on January 26, 2006,
the parties verbally agreed to and read into a hearing record before an
AJ, terms of a settlement agreement. Subsequently, the agency
memorialized an agreement between the two in writing and included
additional details and terms to those agreed at the hearing. The agency
acknowledged that it twice sent the written settlement agreement
to complainant’s attorney, LR, in an attempt to obtain complainant’s
signature. In addition, the agency acknowledged that it sent a lump sum
payment to complainant and complainant returned the payment. Based on
the evidence of record, it is clear that complainant does not view the
matter as settled. It is evidenced further that the agency did not view
the matter as settled as it attempted to obtain complainant’s signature
on a written settlement agreement that contained additional terms than
those provided on January 26 at the hearing. We find that equitable
considerations mandate that the subject settlement agreement be found
void and the agency’s finding of no breach be VACATED. Accordingly,
we REMAND this matter to the agency for reinstatement of the underlying
EEO complaint from the point where processing ceased.
Lastly, EEOC Management Directive 110, 7-4 (November 9, 1999) provides,
“[i]f the Administrative Judge sets a hearing site that is outside the
local commuting area of the agency’s organizational component where the
complaint arose, the agency must bear all reasonable travel expenses
of complainants, their authorized representatives [as long as they are
federal employees.]” Based on the record, the instant hearing was held
outside the local commuting area for complainant so the agency shall
bear all reasonable travel expenses of complainant.
5. if [complainant] rescinds or otherwise declares this Agreement void
for any reason, he shall return to the Army any monetary and non-monetary
benefits he received under this Agreement and the [agency] may revoke
all actions and promises made under this Agreement.
Robert W. Bendorf,
Complainant,
v.
Dr. Francis J. Harvey,
Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01200640131
Hearing No. 240-2005-000193X
Agency Nos. ARFTCAMP04NOV086352
DECISION
