does your request for relief have a nexus to your claim?
The particulars of what relief may be awarded, and what proof is
necessary to obtain that relief, are set forth in detail in EEOC
Notice No. N-915.002, Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, (July 14, 1992) (Guidance).
Briefly stated, the complainant must submit evidence to show that the
agency’s discriminatory conduct directly or proximately caused the losses
for which damages are sought. Id. at 11-12, 14; Rivera v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994). The amount awarded
should reflect the extent to which the agency’s discriminatory action
directly or proximately caused harm to the complainant and the extent
to which other factors may have played a part. Guidance, at 11-12.
The amount of non-pecuniary damages should also reflect the nature and
severity of the harm to the complainant, and the duration or expected
duration of the harm. Id. at 14.
Complainant claimed that as a result of her August 1996 termination,
she was entitled to the full amount of her student loan and interest
($46,228.00), personal loans (over $10,000.00), her back rent ($7,371.00),
and moving/furniture storage expenses ($12,250.00).
With regard to her student loan, the AJ stated that complainant incurred
the debt well before her termination from the agency, or at least starting
in 1995. The AJ added that complainant had been in school approximately
2 years prior to her employment with the agency. The AJ also noted that
by the spring of 1998, complainant had already earned 136 credits which
were normally a sufficient amount of credits to graduate, but she had
changed her major and lacked adequate credits in her major. Thus, the AJ
found and we agree that complainant failed to establish proximate cause.
With regard to her personal loans, the AJ found and we agree that
complainant failed to provide any documentation, other than her own
assertions, in support of this debt and thus failed to establish a nexus.
With regard to the back rent, the AJ noted that complainant commenced her
rental agreement with her landlord well after her August 1996 termination
from the agency as she acquired possession of her apartment on May
1, 1997. The AJ found and we agree that complainant’s termination was
not the proximate cause of her subsequent eviction from the apartment
in April 1998.
With regard to her moving and storage expenses due to the eviction from
her apartment, the AJ also found that complainant began utilizing storage
facilities in January 2000, and thus failed to establish a nexus.
With regard to her medical bills, the AJ noted that complainant claimed
that from 1998, to the present, she had to visit doctors but “Charity
Care” and Medicaid took care of many of her medical bills. The AJ stated
that although complainant submitted a few medical bills, she failed to
make a connection between the termination and the harm. The AJ noted
that complainant indicated that she never received psychiatric care.
Based on the foregoing, the AJ determined that notwithstanding the
agency’s failure to establish good faith in reasonably accommodating
complainant, complainant failed to establish the requisite proximate
cause between the agency’s termination of her employment as a SIS and
her alleged harm. Thus, the AJ found and we agree that complainant was
not entitled to receive compensatory damages. Complainant has not argued
on appeal that she is due an award for non-pecuniary damages.
Accordingly, the agency’s final order on compensatory damages is
AFFIRMED.
